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The New Battle of the Sexes: 
Understanding the Reversal of the Happiness Gender Gap 
 
Abstract 
In the Paradox of Declining Female Happiness, Stevenson and Wolfers (2007) document a new “gender 
gap” between the sexes, in which women today generally report lower subjective well-being relative to 
men.  Motivated by recent work on gender-specific preferences, this paper considers whether changes 
in contraceptive technology, and the Pill especially, may have played some role in the declining relative 
(self-reported) happiness of women.  We examine a simple model in which men and women have 
different preferences over sex and children.  We find that plausible differences in male-female 
preference structures can yield the observed reversal in relative happiness following the introduction of 
a single technology which may prevent conception but yields no disutility to men.  We attempt to 
characterize the fundamental tradeoffs in a static game of complete information, and make some 
extensions to repeated games.  We find that preference structures substantially change the way in 
which the Pill may affect bargaining power and outcomes.  The model suggests that men may have 
benefited more than women from the Pill in particular, and raises the question of whether other forms 
of family planning might better equalize the relative positions of men and women in partnerships.  
These results have particular relevance for feminist critiques of the sexual revolution. 
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I.  Introduction 
In The Paradox of Declining Female Happiness, Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers (2009) 
document a new “gender gap” between the sexes, in which women generally report lower subjective 
well-being relative to men.  The opposite was true in the 1970s.  A reversal of relative happiness 
between men and women took place during a period of time when the women’s movement brought 
significant improvements in opportunities for women (Blau 1998; Blau & Kahn 2007).   
Stevenson and Wolfers do not suggest an explanation for the reversal, but maintain that the 
etiology of the phenomenon should lie within one of three general classes of things: (1) “an aggregate 
change that is impacting women more than men”, (2) a change in reference group so that women feel 3 
 
subjectively worse although objectively they are better off, or (3) some kind of measurement error 
whereby survey questions do not adequately gauge women’s true subjective sense of well-being.
1  The 
most obvious candidate in the first category would be the women’s movement, or some part thereof.  
But since changes of the women’s movement are generally considered beneficial to women, this raises 
the paradox in question.   
This paper investigates another candidate in the first category, namely, the massive shock to 
reproductive technology with the arrival of the Pill in 1960, and extended after-shocks throughout the 
1960s and early 1970s which eventually provided universal access to the Pill and abortion for both 
married and unmarried women.
2  These changes certainly qualify as an aggregate change affecting 
women more than men.  Several studies in the economic literature have already demonstrated the 
power of the Pill to affect women’s outcomes, both for the better—especially Goldin and Katz (1998, 
2000)—and also for the worse, notably Akerlof, Yellen and Katz (1996).  A finding common to both of 
these studies is that the Pill treats groups of women differentially via marriage and mating markets in 
such a way as to provide gains for career-minded or progressive women, but losses for those women 
who do not want or expect careers, and those who especially value childbearing.
3   
What about women more generally?  If we consider that sex and children are “bundled” by nature—
that is, there is a natural function relating one to the other—we can think of contraceptive technology 
as shifting the slope of the function which relates sex and children.  In so doing, it changes (expands) the 
                                                            
1 Stevenson & Wolfers (2009) 
2 The Pill (combined oral contraceptive) was approved for contraceptive use by the FDA in 1960, but was not 
available to married women in all states until the Supreme Court case Griswold v. Connecticut in 1965.  Unmarried 
women likewise had differential access until 1973 when the Supreme Court decided Eisenstadt v. Baird. 
3 This latter group of women are those for whom the “cost of pregnancy” p(f) in Akerlof, Yellen and Katz is 
negative.  They would rather have a baby and no husband, than no baby and no husband.  Another way of 
expressing this is to say these women have a strong taste or preference for children. 4 
 
number of feasible combinations of sex and children which can be chosen.
4  If men and women have 
different preference orderings over the feasible allocations of sex and children, it is certainly plausible 
that changes in contraceptive technology could alter gender-specific outcomes such as personal 
satisfaction or subjective well-being.  
Survey data suggest that there are profound differences in preferences for both sex and 
childbearing across genders.
5  For example, the finding that “an active sexual life” ranks more highly for 
men than for women is robust.  Moreover, having children seems central to the happiness of most 
women, though not for male counterparts.  For example, a 1997 Pew Survey found that “ninty-three 
percent of mothers think their children are a source of happiness all or most of the time.  Eighty-six 
percent of mothers of children under age eighteen say their relationship to their children is crucial to 
their personal happiness (10 on a 10-point scale).”
6  On the other hand, for men, children often rank no 
higher than career as a source of happiness.   
Even more compelling than collected survey data is recent work by Kohler, Behrman and Skytthe 
(2005) identifying the effect of sexual partnerships and fertility on the overall well-being of men and 
women.  The authors employ data from the Danish twin study to control for possible selection bias into 
partnerships and childbearing on the basis of genetic traits which might predispose for happiness.  They 
find that sexual partnerships (either marriage or cohabitations) provide sizable improvements in well-
being for both men and women compared to those not in partnerships.  This positive effect is much 
stronger for males than for females, and the effects are large compared to overall (within-twin pair) 
variation in subjective well-being.   For example, they find that “a current partnership provides an 
                                                            
4 To see this, consider that for a given number of children, CT increases the number of sexual encounters which 
might map into a desired family size; at the same time, for a given level of sexual activity, CT lowers the lower 
bound on the number of children which may result. 
5 Ellis, et al 2008; Geary, 2002, 2003; Popenoe, Hakim, many more. 
6 Rhoads, 2004, Taking Sex Differences Seriously, p. 191.  Rhoads cites a 1997 Pew Research Center for the People 
and the Press Survey entitled As Women See It: Motherhood Today—A Tougher Job, Less Ably Done 5 
 
improvement in well-being of 39 percent (females) and 65 percent (males) of one standard deviation, 
and the relative size of this effect increases to 43 percent (females) and 73 percent (males) of one 
standard deviation if it is expressed in terms of within-twin pair variation, that is, variation in subjective 
well-being that is net of endowments.”
7  Additionally, Kohler, Behrman and Skytthe identify a 
substantial and significant male-female difference in the effect of children on well-being—after 
controlling for the effect of a current partnership.  “Females derive happiness gains from children even 
after controlling for current partnership status.  The happiness of males, however, depends primarily on 
partnership status; once current partnership is controlled, men’s happiness does not vary systematically 
with fertility.” 
Kohler, Behrman and Skytthe’s findings constitute the empirically strongest evidence to date that 
sexual partnerships and fertility provide differential payoffs for men and for women.  Since sex and 
children are jointly produced by partners with different preference structures, there is a truly plausible 
“battle of the sexes,” which may be characterized.  Indeed, strategic interactions between partners as to 
sexual frequency and fertility may constitute a far more interesting battle than the classic one presented 
in canonical texts on game theory.  In this paper we attempt to construct the simplest plausible model of 
such interactions using stylized preferences based on the KBS findings.  We then explore the effects on 
subjective well-being which may ensue following a contraceptive shock which alters the feasible 
allocations of sex and children within a partnership.  We find that such a model can predict the observed 
reversal in the happiness gender gap if the contraceptive shock is persistent and widespread.    
 
II.  The Model—Simultaneous Game 
a.  Strategies 
                                                            
7 Kohler et al, 2005, p. 426 6 
 
The game is played between a man and a woman.  The game is interpreted as a partnership 
between the players.  It may describe a single decision node or characterize a strategic interaction that 
is played out over the course of the partnership.   
Each player has a choice set with two possible strategies.  Men may choose between levels of 
children, high or low, denoted K1 and K0.  Women may choose the level of sexual activity, high or low, 
denoted S1 and S0.
8  In each case, high and low are differentiated only in that “high” is non-trivially larger 
than “low.”  That is, “high” kids might mean 1, or 2—so long as “low” kids means just zero or one.   
b.  Outcomes 
Table 1 shows the outcomes of the game. There are three possible outcomes: high levels of sex and 
children (box A, “adults”), low levels of both (box D, “duds”), and the hybrid (box C, “contraceptors”) 
with high sex and low kids.  We exclude from consideration the low sex-high kids outcome (box B, 
“busted”) as largely infeasible.   
    Women 
    S1  S0 
Men 
K1  A  B 
K0  C  D 
Table 1 
c.  Preferences 
We make the stylized assumptions that all women prefer more children to fewer children (or 
some to none) and that all men prefer more sex to less sex (or some to none).  With this assumption 
there are two possible preference orderings for both men and women, leading to two types of each.   
                                                            
8 The game may also be interpreted as a single opportunity or decision node within a relationship, where s1 
denotes the choice to have sex, s0 the choice to abstain, k1 be the choice to have another child, and k0 the choice 
to not do so.  7 
 
We suppose that all men prefer the high sex outcomes (A or C) to the low sex outcome (D).  
Men are therefore differentiated by preferences over children.  Let the preferences of type 1 men, M1, 
be given by C >> A >> D.  And let type two men, M2, be characterized by A >> C >> D.   Type 1 men—call 
them “bachelors”—prefer to be sexually active without kids.  Type 2 men—“family men”—share the 
female ranking for children.  They prefer, at least weakly, to have children and an active sex life over 
having only an active sex life.   
In a similar stylized fashion, all women prefer the outcome high sex-high kids to low sex-low 
kids, or A >> D.  What differentiates women is whether they rank the high sex-low kids outcome (box C) 
over the low sex-low kids outcome (box D), or not.  Let the preferences of type 1 women, W1, be the 
former—A >> C >> D; and let the preferences of type 2 women, W2 , be the latter—A >> D >> C.  Type 1 
women want to have children but share the male ranking over sex.  This can be understood plainly as a 
taste for sexual activity—or more broadly as a preference for companionship and sexual partnership 
even if they are not able to obtain children.  Pursuant to our stylistic descriptions, we’ll call these 
women “bachelorettes.”   
Type 2 women also want to have children, but they do not share the male sexual profile—they 
would prefer to have no partnership, or a weak one, rather than have a sexual partnership and no 
children.  We’ll call these women “family women.”  The category might include conservative or religious 
women who do not want to have a sexual partnership outside of a stable, child-oriented framework 
(such as marriage).  Second, these might be women with a very strong preference for children—so 
strong that they would resent a sexual partner who will not give them children, preferring to be alone 
than to have such a partner.  “Family women” exhibit the ranking A >> D >> C.
9  
                                                            
9 Both types are discussed in different terms in Akerlof, Yellen and Katz (1996).   8 
 
For the games considered here, we will consider how various pairings of preferences structures 
for men and women might affect the outcomes of play under stylized assumptions in the presence of a 
single technology which makes box C feasible for both partners.  Existing qualitative and quantitative 
survey data allow for estimation of which preference structures and pairings are likely to be prevalent in 
the population for a given cohort.  We also contend that men and women may exhibit different 
preference structures at different points in the life cycle.  This is treated in section III.   
d.  Games 
For clarity, we will assign payoff values to the players of the game corresponding to their 
preference orderings with three being the highest.  Players maximize utility.  Players form a 
“partnership” if their strategies cross at a feasible box.  Infeasible outcomes are assigned a zero payoff 
to both parties.  These could be interpreted as the termination of a partnership.
10   
Prior to the contraceptive shock, there are two possible pure strategy Nash equilibria: outcome 
A (high sex, high kids), and outcome D (low sex, low kids).
11  Depending on the types of women and 
men, the payoffs for outcome A may be either (2, 3) or (3, 3), and the payoffs for outcome D may be 
either (1, 1) or (1, 2).  For any pairings of preferences, the Nash equilibria are still the same.  Partners 
who coordinate in either of those strategy spaces (A or D) will have no unilateral incentive to deviate.  
This is illustrated in table 2.   
Table 2 
    Women 
    S1  S0 
Men 
K1  A  (0, 0) 
K0  (0, 0)  D 
                                                            
10 Outcome B has more significance when the game is considered as a single decision node in a repeated game.  
Then it becomes useful as a threat point.  More on this in the appendix and extensions to repeated games. 
11 See the appendix for discussion of possible mixed strategy Nash equilibria to this game. 9 
 
  So couples tended to coordinate as “adults” or as “duds” prior to a contraceptive shock.  Duds—
playing strategies which yield a Pareto-dominated outcome—would be the minority population and 
would need some exogenous rationale for playing the dominated strategy (such as a religious norm or 
social custom).  A natural interpretation might be to call these “single people.”  Adults—enjoying the 
Pareto efficient outcome—formed fairly stable partnerships which were both sexually active and 
produced families.  It would be natural to interpret these as “married people.”     
  Importantly, however, relative “happiness” with the outcomes will indeed depend on the types 
of women and men who are paired.  All women will be happy with the high sex-high kids outcome “A”, 
as it ranks above other outcomes, feasible and infeasible.  But only “family men” will be equally as 
happy as these women, since they shared the female preference ranking over children and their 
preferences for sex are satisfied.  Men with the “bachelor” profile will be less happy than the women 
they are partnered with, since children are not as important to their happiness.     
  We now consider how a contraceptive shock changes the dynamics of the game.  We consider 
games of the form given in table 3—allowing couples to partner in box “C”.  We then consider how 
differential preference structures can influence outcomes after the shock, and analyze changes in 
relative welfare. 
Table 3 
    Women 
    S1  S0 
Men 
K1  A  (0, 0) 
K0  C  D 
 
To determine the equilibria of the possible games we need to specify the players and the preference 
structures.  We begin with a game between type 1 men and women, bachelors and bachelorettes, 
shown in table 4.   10 
 
Game 1: Bachelor & Bachelorette 





Following convention, payoffs on the left are for the player on the left and payoffs on the right are for 
the player on the top.  Straightforwardly, in contrast to the pre-shock game, there is a single pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium for play between men and women with these preference structures.  The 
equilibrium is high sex- low kids, or (K0, S1), brokered by the contraceptive shock.    
Note that the unique Nash equilibrium is the preferred outcome for men, but not for women.  In 
contrast to the pre-shock equilibrium, the relative outcomes for men and women have been reversed.  
In the ex-ante game, women would have been relatively happier than their partners.  But ex-post, men 
are relatively more happy.
12  Moreover, couples will have fewer children ex-post than in the pre-shock 
scenario. 
In a simple interpretation, the contraceptive shift can account for a reduction in fertility, and the 
reversal of relative happiness between women and men, both of which correspond to observed trends 
in fertility and self-reported happiness since the widespread adoption of the Pill by both married and 
single partners in the 1960s and 1970s.  This can occur if enough men and women exhibit bachelor and 
bachelorette preference profiles.   
There is one further interpretation which is worth considering.  Women’s dissatisfaction with 
the Nash equilibrium outcome in game 1 may create tension and instability in a partnership.  This was 
not the case in the pre-shock scenario where both partners had their highest possible payoff and no 
                                                            
12 Assuming we can extend the logic of payoffs or outcome to some notion of “happiness” or welfare. 
    Women 
    S1  S0 
Men 
K1  (2, 3)  (0, 0) 
K0  (3, 2)  (1, 1) 11 
 
incentive to deviate or separate.  But in game 1, bachelorettes would like to achieve a higher payoff in a 
sexual partnership that also yields a child.  The least-cost option is for a bachelorette to try and convince 
her partner to support a child; if that doesn’t work, depending on her level of impatience for children, 
she may leave and look for a family man.
13  Thus, if the couple had been married, divorce is more likely 
than in the pre-shock scenario; if they are unmarried, they are even more likely to break up since the 
costs of exiting the relationship are lower.  Over time, the framework would suggest that men and 
women will have a greater number of short-term relationships.  This dynamic could be expressed in 
lower marriage rates, higher divorce rates, and higher rates of cohabitation, all of which are consistent 
with observed trends.
14  Again, this conclusion depends on preference profiles in the general population. 
We now turn to a game played between bachelors and family women, shown in table 5.  
Table 5. Game 2: Bachelor & Family Woman  
M1 x W2 
 
 
    Women 
    S1  S0 
Men 
K1  (2, 3)  (0, 0) 
K0  (3, 1)  (1, 2) 
 
The unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium is low sex-low kids, which is Pareto inefficient: both players 
would be better off with outcome A, high sex-high kids.  In this game, the contraceptive shock leads to a 
decline in fertility, a decrease in sexual activity, and reduced welfare for both men and women. 
                                                            
13 We model women’s impatience explicitly in the repeated game as the discount factor.  We suppose that women 
have a discount factor which is “impatient” to the degree that she is closer to the end of fertility and still has no 
child.  This is an elegant way to model the proverbial “biological clock ticking.” 
14 This interpretation also raises other interesting questions for the dynamic in repeated games: namely, that of 
truth-telling.  In such a game, women will be competing for type 2 men.  As a consequence, type 1 men will have 
an incentive to hide their true type.  We explore this in the extension to repeated games. 12 
 
As in the previous game, the contraceptive shock also generates instability in the partnership. 
The inefficiency of the outcome is known to both partners, and they both know that they could have 
higher payoffs if they could change the situation.  The bachelor would prefer to find a bachelorette, 
while the family woman would be happier with a family man.  The implications of this game are identical 
to those for game 1: the instability introduced by a contraceptive shock could be reflected in lower 
marriage rates, higher divorce rates, and higher rates of cohabitation.  We note that this instability is 
related to a matter of “sorting”—or finding partners with the preference profiles of choice, and this is 
discussed below. 
The next partnership we consider is that between a family man and a bachelorette, illustrated in 
Table 6.   
Table 6. Game 3: Family Man & Bachelorette 
M2 x W1 
 
 
    Women 
    S1  S0 
Men 
K1  (3, 3)  (0, 0) 
K0  (2, 2)  (1, 1) 
 
In this game, both players have identical preferences over the outcomes and the unique Nash 
equilibrium is high sex-high kids. This outcome is identical to the pre-shock game. The introduction or 
availability of contraception has no effect on these partnerships.  Both partners want to have children, 
so contraception is irrelevant. 
  In a final game we consider family men and family women, shown in table 7. 
   13 
 
 
Table 7. Game 4: Family Man & Family Woman 
M2 x W2 
 
 
    Women 
    S1  S0 
Men 
K1  (3, 3)  (0, 0) 
K0  (2, 1)  (1, 2) 
 
The game has two pure strategy Nash equilibria: high sex-high kids, and low sex-low kids.  The first 
Pareto dominates the second, as in the pre-shock game.  With some communication between players, 
the family man and the family woman can coordinate their strategies to arrive at the best outcome.  As 
in game 3, the availability of contraception has no effect on the outcomes of partnerships. 
e.  Comments 
Within our stylized assumptions, the effects of a contraceptive shock depend critically on the 
type of man.  The contraceptive shock creates instability in relationships with bachelor-profile men, but 
none in family man partnerships regardless of the type of woman. This is an interesting asymmetry.   
Another asymmetry worth mentioning is this: women can only achieve their maximum utility by 
choosing the thing that men prefer most (high sex); this is true both before and after the contraceptive 
shock.  But the shock provides a “benefit” to men insofar as bachelor-type men may get what they 
prefer most (high sex) without what women prefer most (kids).  Stevenson and Wolfers asked whether 
men had somehow garnered a “disproportionate share” of the benefits of the women’s movement.  
This model would suggest instead that men may have garnered a disproportionate share of the benefits 
of the contraceptive revolution.  This is a possibility worth serious reflection—and consideration of 14 
 
whether alternative means of family planning might do a better job at equalizing the balance of power 
in gender dynamics post-Pill.     
A final note is that the fundamental tension in the model derives from the fact that each partner 
has relative control over the good most desired by the other partner.  Stable partnerships are those in 
which there is a “cooperative” preference structure—or where partners unwittingly maximize over the 
preferences of the other player by maximizing over their own.   
Various sections of the appendix examine extensions to repeated games.  The insights remain 
fundamentally similar in spirit, though a richer set of realistic strategies and interpretations can be 
developed.  Of particular interest is that the preference profiles for women become more important in 
the repeated game set-up.  An important extension we have yet to develop is the effect of differential 
discount rates allowing for biological “impatience” on the part of women of both types.   
III.  Discussion 
 
A natural question which deserves some reflection is: why is the Pill different from earlier 
contraceptive shocks?  See Westoff and Ryder’s Contraceptive Revolution for a classification of 
reproductive technique.  Although there were significant social movements beginning as early as 1800 
which involved the diffusion of contraceptive techniques (as well as rudimentary contraceptive devices), 
the most commonly used forms of birth control interfered directly with intercourse—such as rhythm, 
withdrawal, and prophylactics—rendering them unsuitable in various ways for steady and long term use.  
Further, the usage of these methods depended almost entirely on men.  As a consequence these 
methods tended to be practiced only intermittently throughout childbearing years.  In light of the above, 
if men have stronger preferences for sex than women, pre-Pill era birth control would generally have 
rendered greater disutility to men than to women, putting men in the position of having to decide 15 
 
between (good) sex and paying for more babies.  This would give a slightly higher equilibrium number of 
children per woman—with men facing the biggest tradeoffs.  Male-dependent contraception that 
reduces the utility of sex will not be un-used (note the huge declines in fertility during the 1800s—from 
8 births per woman to 4 births per woman).  But it should be unlikely to get men all the way to their 
desired levels of children since their own preferences will prohibit strict consistent use of these 
methods.  It is worth emphasizing that the simple analyses presented in this paper depend on the 
contraceptive shock having absolutely no effect on the utility of sex (or children) for either player.  It 
might be a useful exercise to look at how outcomes would be different under a contraceptive regime 
which implied a more judicious balance of power between men and women’s interests in a partnership.   
A second question raised by this brief analysis: how should we interpret the Goldin and Katz (2002) 
finding that every cohort of women since the Pill has had fewer children than they wanted to have?  
Goldin and Katz brush the finding aside in a footnote, suggesting the disparity reflects the outcome of 
trade-offs that women make between family and work.  But it may be worth revisiting this question in 
the data, and creating some qualitative studies to get clues as to what is going on.  Studies of fertility 
outcomes have focused almost exclusively on women and their fertility desires, as well as their life 
trade-offs and circumstances.  Perhaps we need new research which looks instead at the fertility 
outcomes as the process of a gender dynamic between partners or spouses.  Do we have a good 
appreciation for how fertility decisions are made?  Do we have any sense of which partner has the 
“upper hand” in those discussions/negotiations?  What we want to know is whether fertility outcomes 
can or should be understood purely as the result of a female calculus over work, family and education 
variables—or rather if they are more a result of bargaining and joint-decision making between partners.  
If the latter, we will need to consider how various reproductive technologies affect the bargaining 
position of women.  This suggests a new avenue for research which is especially relevant for feminist 
critiques of the sexual revolution.   16 
 
Finally, this paper makes some predictions which should be testable with the right sort of data.  No 
existing study has tried to correlate contraceptive practice and subjective well-being, and it is difficult to 
imagine being able to do so in a manner which meets the strictest standards of econometric practice.  
There are few examples of natural experiments which can provide exogenous variation in contraceptive 
use, access, or efficacy.  Moreover, any such study will inevitably run into the difficulties posed by all 
“happiness” research—how to find results net of psychological and genetic endowments which 
predispose for happiness.   The KBS study suggests that twin data may be the best avenue for pursuing 
correlates of happiness, though the problem of self-selected contraceptive use remains a challenge.  In 
any case, it is not entirely obvious how to translate the simple models in this paper into econometric 
models.  One would need to be far more specific—apply tighter interpretations—about the nature of 
the strategies, partnership phases, and more.  This is something worth considering over time. 
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A.  Repeated/Dynamic Games 
Here we model repeated interactions between the same man and the same woman.  We can 
interpret the repeated game itself as the whole partnership, and the stage game represents a single 
period or decision node within that relationship.  The most obvious interpretation is for the stage game 
to represents a single decision about sex during the relationship—but we favor an interpretation which 
is less strict.  We take these nodes to represent decisions or strategies played within longer periods of 
time, such as months, or years, or phases of the relationship.  Following this, the stage game may be 
interpreted as the beginning of the relationship, and the repeated game as whole of the relationship. 
The payoffs of repeated games are discounted payoffs of the stage games summed over the 
duration of the game. Here they are normalized so the payoffs to the repeated game are comparable to 
the payoffs of the repeated game: a payoff of one at every stage is equal to one. 
Table 8. Stage Game for Repeated Bachelor & Bachelorette 





Table 8 shows the stage game for repeated games between a type 1 woman and a type 1 man.  The 
game is identical to the one-shot game presented earlier.  The unique Nash equilibrium of the stage 
game is high sex- low kids, with payoffs (3, 2). Her minmax payoff is 2, and his minmax payoff is 1. The 
minmax payoff is the payoff a player receives when he maximizes his payoff while his opponent tries to 
minimize it. A player’s minmax payoff is a lower bound to his payoffs and is the maximum punishment 
    Women 
    S1  S0 
Men 
K1  (2, 3)  (0, 0) 
K0  (3, 2)  (1, 1) 19 
 
that a player may receive from another. A common strategy in repeated games is a “trigger” strategy, 
where a player is punished with his minmax payoff if he deviates from an expected sequence of moves. 
In this game, the bachelorette’s payoff in the stage game Nash equilibrium is equal to her 
minmax payoff.  She maximizes her payoff by playing the high sex strategy, but the bachelor minimizes 
her payoff by playing low kids.  Note that the choice not to have children both maximizes the man’s 
payoff and minimizes the woman’s.  This fact may have significant consequences for the relationship, as 
a bachelorette playing this game may be unable to discern the true intentions of her bachelor.  Is he 
merely acting in his own self-interest by maximizing his payoff, or is he punishing her by minimizing 
hers?  If she suspects the latter, she may come to resent him and the partnership may be in peril. 
SPE Payoffs in Infinitely Repeated W1×M1 Game 
 
Figure 1 shows the set of payoffs in subgame perfect equilibria for the infinitely repeated game 
between the bachelor and bachelorette. The horizontal dashed line is his minmax value, and the vertical 
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the dotted line. For each point in this set, there exists a discount rate above which the payoffs of that 
point correspond to the subgame perfect equilbrium of an infinitely repeated game.
15 
The set of possible SPE payoffs includes both point (2, 3) and (3, 2). This outcome differs from 
the Nash equilibrium to the stage game, where (3, 2) was the only outcome. The infinite repetition of 
this game creates the possibility that the bachelorette will get her preferred outcome of (2, 3). However, 
a woman only attains a payoff of 3 in the repeated game if she gets a payoff of 3 each time the game is 
played, beginning with the first. Additionally, the stage game may be interpreted as the initial phase of 
the relationship, and the NE to this stage game is (sex, no children). This is reflective of typical 
relationships, as most couples use contraception when they first become sexually active. The payoffs to 
the woman in this initial phase will be 2 and for the man will be 3. If this pattern continues, then the 
payoffs for the repeated game will be (3, 2), with women being relatively less satisfied than men. 
Furthermore, the bachelor receives his maximal payoff, and the bachelorette has an interest in shifting 
the outcome of the stage game at some point in the relationship. 
To shift the outcome of the repeated game, she could employ a simple trigger strategy: she 
would agree to have sex (play s1) without children until some point T, after which point she would 
expect the man to have children (play k1); if he does not, then she would deny him sex (play s0) 
thereafter. If this strategy is credible, then a best response for the bachelor is not to have children (play 
k0) up to T and then have children (play k1). The triggered response, a permanent denial of sex, would 
naturally be interpreted as the end of the partnership. 
This particular trigger strategy is not likely to be very successful in practice. The threat to 
permanently deny sex may not be credible. Assuming that the relationship persists, the denial of sex 
punishes the woman and the man, and the fact that she is willing to remain in the relationship may 
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imply that she is willing to reconcile with him eventually. If the relationship ends, then the denial of sex 
will last only until the man is able to find another woman. This strategy will be more effective with less 
attractive or successful men, and less so with more attractive men. 
This trigger strategy employs the use of a threat (denial of sex) in order to try and compel action 
(having children), a fact which limits its effectiveness in practice. This strategy is classified as a 
compellent threat, and threats are not good at compelling action. Typically, threats are more effective in 
deterring action and promises are more effective in compelling it. A classic method to respond to a 
compellent threat is to employ salami tactics, in which the threat is reduced little by little (“slice by 
slice”) until it is no longer a threat. In this case, the bachelor would keep promising to have children in 
the future, e.g. “next time” or “next month” or “next year” or “when I get promoted,” etc. Each time the 
he  successfully delays having children he shifts the outcome of the overall game more in his favor, away 
from (2, 3) towards (3, 2). 
Table 9. Stage Game for Repeated Bachelor & Family woman 





Table 8 shows the stage game for repeated games between a type 2 woman and a type 1 man, or family 
women and bachelors.  The stage game NE is (no sex, no children) with payoffs (1, 2).  
   
    Women 
    S1  S0 
Men 
K1  (2, 3)  (0, 0) 
K0  (3, 1)  (1, 2) 22 
 
 
SPE Payoffs in Infinitely Repeated W2×M1 Game 
 
Figure 6 shows the set of payoffs to subgame perfect equilibria for the infinitely repeated game 
between a type 1 man and a type 2 woman. The horizontal and vertical dashed lines are his and hers 
minmax values, respectively. The set of equilibrium payoffs is the area in the triangle to the left of the 
dotted line. For each point in this set, there exists a discount rate above which the payoffs of that point 
correspond to the subgame perfect equilbrium of an infinitely repeated game between the players. 
The outcome of this game differs significantly from the previous match: the set of SPE payoffs 
includes the point (3, 2). While the Nash equilibrium payoffs of the stage game were (2, 1), the infinite 
repetition opens up the possibility of equilibrium payoffs of (3, 2) but not (1, 3). The type 2 woman is 
unwilling to use contraception, and her unwillingness prevents her from receiving her lowest payoff and 
prevents the type 1 man from getting his highest payoff. 
As with the last match, in order for the woman to get her highest payoff in the repeated game, 
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with the (sex, no children) equilibrium, this match begins with the (no sex, no children) equilibrium, the 
NE to the stage game. From this point, both partners have an interest in shifting the outcome from (1,2) 
to (2,3), while only the man has an interest in shifting the outcome towards (1, 3). Because both 
partners agree that (sex, children) is preferred to (no sex, no children), movement towards (3, 2) from 
(2, 1) has the support of both partners and could be easily accomplished. This is a contrast with the 
other match in which movement from (2, 3) to (3, 2) had the support of the woman but was opposed by 
the man. 
The insights from the repeated games suggest that bachelorettes will tend to be sexually active 
in the earlier phases of a relationship, but have fewer children and be less happy than family women, 
who are less sexually active in the earlier phases of the relationship and have more children. These 
differences come from the differences in women’s preferences not in the type of man. Both types of 
women are happy with type 2 men, but only women with the family woman profile are happy with 
bachelors, who form the majority if we trust the Kohler, Behrman and Skytthe estimates. 
Extension of this model that remain to be developed include a consideration of the role of 
commitment in repeated games and a disparate discount rates for men and women. For example, how 
would the outcome be affected if women hyperbolically discount due to “impatience” for a child? 
 
 